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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action for recovery of certain 
profit sharing benefits pursuant to a Profit Sharing and 
Retirement Plan of the Defendant, P M Engineers, Inc., and the 
Counterclaim of P M Engineers, Inc. for breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION BY THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
On the 19th day of April, 1976, upon Plaintiff James M. 
Burrows' Motion for Summary Judgment, a hearing was had in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, before 
the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin. On the 5th day of May, 1976, 
the Court entered Summary Judgment for the Plaintiff and against 
the Defendant and dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim with 
prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the Summary Judgment vacated and 
remanded for trial or in the alternative for Summary Judgment 
for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff. 
STATEMENTS OF THE FACTS 
From May, 1959, to January 7, 1975, the Plaintiff, James 
M. Burrows, was an employee of P M Engineers, Inc. (TR-141). 
During that period of time, the Defendant, P M Engineers, Inc., 
had in force and effect a Profit Sharing and Retirement Plan 
(TR-71-163) of which the Plaintiff was a member (TR-228). 
During 1974, the Plaintiff in his capacity as an employee of 
P M Engineers, Inc. worked as an inspector at the Main Post Office 
project (TR-210). In his capacity as an inspector at the Main Post 
Office project, the Defendant removed material from the construction 
site. (TR-473-476). Said removal of materials was without authori-
zation of PM Engineers, Inc. (Deposition of Paul Mc Gill at Page 71). 
Additionally, while a stockholder and employee of Defendant corpora-
tion, Plaintiff worked for outside firms which were in direct 
competition with the Defendant (TR-494-495), and charged Defendant 
corporation with unauthorized mileage and overtime (TR-512-514). 
While an employee of the Defendant corporation, the Plaintiff 
herein became a member of the company's Profit Sharing Plan. As 
a member of that Plan, the Plaintiff was entitled to certain con-
tingent benefits by virtue of contributions made solely by Defen-
dant corporation to the Profit Sharing Plan (TR-78, 81, 82, 85, 
87, 88). Pursuant to the terms of said Profit Sharing Plan, the 
rights to the benefits were subject to divestment when a member 
of said Plan is terminated for Material Dishonesty or failure to 
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors (TR-91), and further 
subject to payment of benefits over a period of years not to exceed 
ten years if payment of benefits is appropriate (TR-85). When 
the Plaintiff had been terminated, the Defendant corporation 
notified the Administrative Committee of the Profit Sharing Plan 
that said termination of the Plaintiff was for acts it considered 
to be materially dishonest (Exhibit P-4 Deposition of Paul Mc Gill) 
and failure to follow the instructions of the Board of Directors. 
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The Administrative Committee upheld the determination of the 
Board of Directors and then notified the Plaintiff of the deter-
mination and invoked the Plan procedures, which called for arbi-
tration of the dispute between the parties. (TR-unnumbered pages 
between 164 and 165, and TR-178). The Plaintiff then refused 
to arbitrate and filed this law suit (TR-506). 
The Defendant corporation answered said law suit and filed 
its own Counterclaim, claiming damages by virtue of those acts 
perpetrated against the Defendant corporation by the Plaintiff 
(TR-204-212). That in addition, punitive damages are being sought 
by way of counterclaim based on the malicious actions of the 
Defendant, both prior to and subsequent to the filing of this 
action, which acts were intended to harm and to damage all of the 
Defendants herein (TR-204-212). On the 5th day of April, 1976, 
Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (TR-348). The 
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin 
on the 19th day of April, 1976 (TR-350). On the 5th day of May, 
1976, the Court entered the following Order: 
1. "Plaintiff be the same is hereby awarded 
Judgment against the Defendants, P M Engineers, 
Inc., Paul Mc Gill, Richard K. Klein, and Gail 
0. Payne, as the Administrative Committee of the 
Profit Sharing and Retirement Plan of P M Engineers, 
Inc., in the sum of $21,406.50 (which sum represents 
the balance of the Plaintiff's Profit Sharing 
Account as of December 31, 1974, in the sum of 
$25,183.06 with 85% vesting), together with interest 
at the rate of 6% per annum from Janaury 1, 1975 
to the date of this judgment, the sum of $1,712.4 5 
together with interest at the rate of 8% from the 
date hereof until paid, and the Plaintiff's costs 
and disbursements. 
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2. The claim of Plaintiff's for punitive damages 
for wrongful termination of Plaintiff and attorney's 
fees, pursuant to the Utah Statute relating to 
wages is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon 
merits. 
3. The counterclaim of the Defendants is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits." 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WERE NO MATERIAL 
ISSUES OF FACT. 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for Summary 
Judgment. Section (C) of the rule specifically provides as follows: 
"...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, dispositions and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." 
In order for a Motion for Summary Judgment to be granted, 
there must be no material issues of fact in dispute, so as to 
entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Disabled American Veterans vs Hendrixson, 9 U. 2d. 152, 340 
P. 2d 416. 
The Court in determining whether or not to grant Summary 
Judgment must view the facts in a light most advantageous to 
the nonmoving party, and must resolve all doubts in favor of 
permitting the nonmoving party to go to trial and grant the 
Motion only when no right to recovery or setoff could be established 
See Controlled Receivables, Inc. vs Harmon, ]7 U. 2d 420, 413 P. 
2d 807 (1956); Foster vs Steed, 19 U. 2d 435, 432 P. 2d 60 
(1967); Thompson vs Ford Motor Company, 16 U. 2d 30, 395 P. 
2d 62 (1964). 
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Since a Summary Judgment prevents litigents from fully 
presenting their case in Court, therefore the Court should be 
reluctant to invoke this harsh remedy. Brandt vs Springville 
Banking Company, 10 U. 2d 350, 353 P. 2d 460. The remedy of 
Summary Judgment is invoked only in cases where the favored party 
makes a showing which precludes as a matter of law awarding 
of any relief to the losing party. Brenner vs Utah Poultry and 
Farmers Co-op, 11 U. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18. Summary Judgment shoul 
be granted with great caution. Watkins vs Simonds, 11 U. 2d 46# 
354 P. 2d 852. 
Finally the Court, in review of a pre-trial Summary Judgment 
of dismissal must accept the facts as the Appellant contends them 
to be. Reliable Furniture Company vs Fidelity and Guarantee 
Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 U. 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685. 
In the present case, the lower Court made two determinations 
which were inconsistent with the rules and cases cited above. 
Said inconsistencies are treated below. 
A. 
A FINDING THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MAKE 
A DETERMINATION OF FORFEITURE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In his decision of May 5, 1976, (TR-432) the Honorable 
Earnest F. Baldwin stated: 
"That the Defendants failed to follow provisions 
of the Profit Sharing Plan, having failed to make 
a "Determination of Forfeiture" as required by the 
Plan and having failed to establish the right to 
forfeit the Plaintiff's Profit Sharing account, are 
not entitled to retain the funds due Plaintiff and 
the Defendants having failed to determine the funds 
would be paid to the Plaintiff over a period of time 
and having failed to follow the provisions of the Plan, 
are obligated to pay Plaintiff the sums due the 
Plaintiff, together with interest accrued thereon." 
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It is respectfully submitted that the question whether or 
not the Committee failed to follow the Provisions of the Profit 
Sharing Plan presents a genuine issue of material factf and 
therefore Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been 
denied and at the very least the matter should have been reserved 
for trial. The Profit Sharing and Retirement Plan of P M 
Engineers, Inc., Article VI, Paragraph 7 (TR-91) provides: 
"If a participant's status as an employee ceases 
because of his discharge from employment for material 
dishonesty or material violation of, or refusal to 
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors of 
the Company, the Company shall promptly notify the 
Committee of the discharge of a participant for either 
of these causes and the Committee shall determine 
whether the Company had just cause for such discharge. 
Any determination by the Committee that the provisions 
of this Article are applicable shall be made within 
ten (10) days after the receipt by the Committee of 
notice of discharge, and written notice of such 
termination shall be given by the Committee to the 
employee, addressed by registered mail to his last 
known address. Within twenty (20) days after the mailing 
of such notice, the former employee may appeal for 
arbitration from the determination of the Committee. 
Failure to appeal within that time shall constitute 
an irrevocable consent by the former employee to 
the determination of the Committee." 
The Plan provisions therefore require (a) that the Board of 
Directors of the Company promptly notify the Committee of the 
discharge of a participant for either material dishonesty or material 
violation of, or refusal to follow the instructions of the Board of 
Directors of the Company? (b) the Committee must determine whether 
the Company had just cause for such discharge; (c) within ten 
(10) days notify the employee that the provisions of the Plan are 
applicable in his case; (d) give such notice by registered mail. 
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As noted above, the Plaintiff, James M. Burrows, was notified of 
his termination on the 26th day of December, 1974, which said 
termination became effective on the 7th day of January, 1975. 
There is no evidence on the record to indicate the date upon which 
the Board of Directors notified the Administrative Committee of 
their determination that the Plaintiff had been terminated for 
cause; however, the minutes of the meeting of the Administrative 
Committee which was held February 21, 1975 (Exhibit P-4, Depositioi 
of Paul Mc Gill) reflect as follows: 
"The Committee has been notified by the Board 
of Directors of P M Engineers, Inc. that all of 
these employees have been terminated by management 
because of acts during the past year which it con-
sidered to be dishonest and not in the best interest 
of P M Engineers, Inc., of which they were all stock-
holders. " 
"...Mr. Green stated that if the terminations were 
for material dishonesty or refusal to follow the 
instructions of the Board of Directors, as the 
letter from the Board has stated, that no funds 
could be distributed under any circumstances until 
the Committee had determined whether or not the 
provisions of the Plan were applicable and, if so, 
that those employees be asked to arbitrate to 
determine the facts surrounding their actions." 
"The Committee determined unanimously that the 
actions were serious enough to warrant the arbitration 
and Mr. Mc Gill stated that there were unanswered 
questions which had to be resolved prior to the 
distribution of any funds. He further stated that 
the Plan had provided a means to determine the fact 
and that those means should be utilized at this time. 
Mr. Mc Gill stated that all of the employees in 
question should be contacted so that their side of 
the story could be told and the matter could be cleared 
up immediately and the first distribution made." 
On the 24th day of February, 1975, the Administrative Committee 
notified the Plaintiff Burrows of their determination which was 
sent by registered letter, return receipt requested (TR-178). 
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Therefore, the uncontroverted facts indicate that Plaintiff was 
terminated because of certain dishonest acts perpetrated by him, 
that the Board of Directors so notified the Administrative Com-
mittee, that the Committee agreed with the determination of the 
Board of Directors, and so notified the Plaintiff of their 
determination. Once this was accomplished, the burden shifted 
to the Plaintiff to call for arbitration within twenty (20) days. 
Plaintiff failed to call for the arbitration and instead filed 
a law suit some fifty-one (51) days after receipt of said notifi-
cation (TR-508-509). Provisions of the Plan provide that his 
failure to appeal within the time then constituted an irrevocable 
consent by the former employee to the determination that the 
Committee made relative thereto (TR-91). Therefore, it is respect-
fully submitted that forfeiture is an automatic process prusuant 
to the applicable provisions of the Plan, and as a matter of law, 
Defendants are entitled to Judgment in their favor. 
It may be argued that genuine issues of a material fact 
remain. The primary one would be whether or not the Committee made 
their determination within the prescribed ten (10) day period. 
In addition, factual issues may remain whether the acts of the 
Plaintiff constituted material dishonesty or failure to follow 
the instructions of the Board of Directors. The latter will be 
dealt with in Point B below. However, if the Court finds that 
factual issues remain relative to the ten (10) day period should 
reverse and remand for trial on this particular issue. 
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B. 
WHETHER DEFENDANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT TO FORFEIT 
THE PROFIT SHARING ACCOUNT, RAISES GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL 
FACTS AND THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION FINDING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RIGHT. 
As a second basis for its ruling the lower Court stated 
in its Summary Judgment that the Defendants failed to establish 
the "right" to forfeit the Plaintiff's Profit Sharing account. 
This particular statement is unclear, since the right to forfeit 
is provided by the Plan itself, which obligates rather than grants 
a right to the Administrative Committee to forfeit in certain 
situations. This being the case, the Defendants need not 
establish the right, and the Court erred in placing the added 
burden on the Defendants. 
If, on the other hand, the Court's contention relative to 
Defendants1 failure to establish the so-called right to forfeit, 
relates to whether or not the reasons for termination constitute 
material dishonesty or material violation of, or refusal to follow 
the instructions of the Board of Directors, then we have an 
entirely different question. 
Here, it is appropriate that we review the acts of Mr. Burrows 
which Defendants have complained and which ultimately led to his 
termination and established a basis for the right to forfeit. 
Those acts are: (a) the unauthorized removal of materials from 
the Main Post Office project; (b) removal of materials from the Main 
Post Office project during working hours (TR-253, 254, 255 and 
Deposition of Oscar Whitten at pa'je 7); (c) working for competitors 
or clients of P M Engineers, Inc. while an employee of that firm 
(TR-258); (d) that Plaintiff charged P M Engineers, Inc. for 
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unauthorized mileage and unauthorized overtime. Since the lower 
Court had before it a Motion for Summary Judgment, these facts 
are assumed to be true. The question then became whether these 
acts constituted material dishonesty or failure to follow the 
instructions of the Board of Directors, so as to cause the Plan 
provisions relative to forfeiture to become operative. 
The lower Court addressed itself to this particular 
question and found that, as a matterof law, the acts of the 
Plaintiff did not constitute material dishonesty or the failure 
to follow the instructions of the Board of Directors. At pages 
477 through 482 of the transcript of the hearing on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Court discussed a theory that the acts 
of the Plaintiff had to relate to his employment in order that 
the right to forfeit be invoked and, once again, the Court found, 
as a matter of law, these acts did not relate to his employment 
and, therefore, the right to forfeit was not established. 
Clearly, the alleged acts perpetrated by the Plaintiff 
relate to employment. Certainly, the removal of materials from 
a Government project by a contract administrator's inspector 
during working hours, the working for competitors of the Defendant, 
and the unauthorized mileage and overtime charges relate to 
Plaintiff's employment. There is a conflict in the record relating 
to these particular acts and whether the acts do, in fact, relate 
to employment, they raise material issues of fact which the trier 
of fact must decide at time of trial. If capable of proof at 
time of trial, Defendant's right to forfeit would thereby be 
established. 
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It is submitted, therefore, that the lower Court found 
said acts of dishonesty not to be material. The word "material11 
is an often used term of art and is synonymous with substantial. 
Lewandoski vs Finkel, 129 Conn. 526 29 A. 2d 762. Both terms ar< 
obscure and incapable of determination as a matter of law. These 
words closely relate to those found in wrongful discharge 
cases where a primary issue is whether or not an employer had 
"good" and sufficient cause for discharge. Once again, these 
words are obscure and where the record contains conflict in this 
regard, the question is one that a jury must decide. Roberts vs 
Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530. Here the facts conflict. 
The issue of materiality must be reserved for time of trial. 
Plaintiff admits working for competitors' clients or 
perspective clients (TR-258). Defendants contend that the workinc 
for competitors falls within the framework of failing to follow 
the instructions of the Board of Directors in that said acts were 
clearly in violation of by-laws of Defendant corporation as well 
as policies thereof. 
It can be argued that the Plan provisions relate only to 
participant's status as an employee and the by-laws would therefor 
not be applicable. However, the Plaintiff was a stockholder as 
well as an employee, as was every other member of the Plan. The 
by-laws do constitute policies of management of the corporation, 
(Section 16-19-25 U.C.A. 1953); therefore, the policies would 
reach the Plaintiff in his capacity as an employee-stockholder. 
The act of working for a competitor then would constitute a failure 
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to follow the instructions of the Board of Directorspursuant 
to the Plan provisions. 
The record supports the proposition that alleged acts charged 
do fall within the scope of material dishonesty or failure to 
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors. The Plaintiff 
raises the point that Defendants' investigation disclosed certain 
dishonest acts after the fact (TR-469). Because of this, 
Plaintiff contends that the Court need take cognizance only of 
the one act alleged — that of removing the material from the 
Government project. This, however, should not be the case. 
So long as the grounds exist, or Plaintiff has portrayed 
materially dishonest acts or acts which constitute failure to 
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors during the 
term of employment, the immediate reason for dismissal is not 
that important. See Bon Heyme vs Tompkins, 89 Minn. 77, 93 N.W. 
901, Kike vs Bank Sav. L Ins. Co., 37 N.M. 346, 23 P 2d. 163. 
These cases did not relate specifically to Profit Sharing Plans, 
but rather were wrongful discharge cases. They do, however, 
have application here. The cases hold that it is sufficient 
that grounds existed at the time of discharge, Marnon vs Vaughn, 
189 Or. 339, 119 P 2d 366, and further hold that it is not 
material that the employer assign another grounds as the cause 
for dismissal. Haag vs Renell, 28 Wash., 2d. 883, 184 P 2d. 442. 
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Therefore, all of Plaintiff's acts should be considered 
as the proverbial "straws" in the determination of whether 
Defendants established the right to forfeit. That determination 
is a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the trier 
of fact and not on motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT DEFENDANTS 
SHOULD PAY BENEFITS IN A LUMP SUM WITH INTEREST THEREON. 
In its Summary Judgment, the lower Court ordered that all 
of Plaintiff's benefits be paid with interest thereon. Article VI, 
Paragraph 2, of the Profit Sharing Plan (TR-85) provides that 
payment of benefits in cases of termination may be made over a 
peirod of years if the Committee so elects. The election is to 
be made within sixty (60)days of termination and cannot be con-
trolling here insofar as Plaintiff is concerned since the issue 
of termination and payment of benefits has undergone judicial proces 
The Profit Sharing Plan of Defendant, P M Engineers, Inc., 
gives rise to contractual obligations on the part of the employer 
and employee. Russel vs Princeton Laboratories, Inc., 321 A 2d. 800 
N.J. (1967), Frazer and Torbett, CPA's vs Kunkel, 401 P.2d. 476 
(Okla.). It has been held that a discharged employee was not 
entitled to immediate payment of vested benefits in profit sharing 
plans, but must abide by the employer's decision to defer payment. 
See Lano vs Rochester Germicide Co., 261 Minn. 556, 113 N.W., 2d. 460 
Here the Plan provides for deferred payments, is contractual and 
the Court erred in ruling otherwise. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS CONTENTION THAT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR CLAIMS 
ARISING OUT OF THEIR COUNTERCLAIM BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL 
DUTY ARISING OUT OF THE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK. 
Section 16-19-25, U.C.A., 1953 supra, provides that by-laws 
may contain provisions for the regulation and management of a 
corporation. 
Under the presumption which imputes notice of corporate 
by-laws, Sterling vs Head Camp, Pacific Jurisdiction, W. of W~, 
28 U. 526, 80 P. 375 (1905), by-laws which are within the corporate 
powers to adopt, bind the stockholders insofar as their rights 
are concernedf whether they have expressly consented to them or 
not. Ainsworth vs Southwestern Drug Corporation, 95 Fed. 2d 172, 
and more recently in Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. vs Rocky Mountain 
Chapter National Electrical Contractors Assn., 370 Fed 2d 463. 
With regard to the relationship established between the 
stockholders in the corporation by the by-laws which are in 
existence at the inception of the relationship, the general 
rule is that a contract has been entered into between the 
stockholders and the corporation. Schroeter vs Barlett Syndicate 
Bldg. Corporation, 8 CAL. 2d. 12, 63 P. 2d 284. Said by-laws 
thus become an integral part of said contract or are in the 
nature and have the same force and effect of a contract as regards 
the rights between the corporation and the shareholders. In re: 
Campbell County Hardware Company, 15 F. 2d 78, and should be 
construed just as any other contract. Toler vs Clark Rural 
Electric Cooperative Corporation, Ky. 512 S.W. 2d 25 (1974). 
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By-Law No. VI of the By-Laws of P M Engineers, Inc. state 
as follows: 
"All stockholders agree that any remuneration 
to them by an outside firm or individual for work 
performed of a nature engaged in by the corporation 
are monies or value due and payable to the corporation. 
In order words, stockholders may not engage in outside 
engineering or related services as an individual, nor 
may one or more stockholder enter into a business which 
provides such service and is intended to generate 
individual profit." (Deposition of Paul Mc Gill, 
Exhibit P-l). 
"This paragraph illustrates the intent and wish and 
reason for the birth of this corporation, to-wit: 
the welding together of individual abilities of the 
stockholders in a team for the mutual benefit of the 
corporation and themselves. Furthermore, it is the 
intent and wish that each stockholder receive monetary 
benefit in direct proportion to his output, both 
efficiency wise and work wise. Therefore, in conse-
quence, there will be no reason for outside work on 
the part of the stockholder and a high incentive 
remaining." 
It is important to note that the above By-Law is to be read 
in the light of By-Law No. IV which provides with only one exceptic 
that stock may be sold only to individuals actively employed by 
the corporation. (Deposition of Paul Mc Gill, Exhibit P-l). 
Reading the two By-Laws together, we see the sense of By-Law 
No. VI, which was intended to mutually bind the stockholders 
in a mutually rewarding venture. It further intended to restrict 
and direct the energies of the stockholder-employee toward specific 
corporate ends. It was not intended to restrict one's activities 
after he was no longer a stockholder. Thus, it does not become 
a restraintive trade nor attempt to restrict one's right to seek 
employment whenever, or wherever, he so desires. Rather, the 
stockholder-employee simply agrees not to work for competiting 
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firms or clients so long as he continues that unique stockholder-
employee relationship. If he does work for competiting firmsf 
then pursuant to the contract, he is required to pay to the cor-
poration those sums received while working for the competiting 
company. 
The By-Law in question was in existence at the inception 
of P M Engineers, Inc. and at the time the Plaintiff became a 
stockholder therein. Thusf pursuant to those cases cited above, 
said By-Law becomes a binding, contractural obligation on him. 
The lower Court in finding otherwise erred. Finding that as a 
matter of law, that Defendants did not have the right to their 
recovery. Once again, if the Defendants could prove a breach 
of contract and their damages at time of trial, they would be 
entitled to judgment in their favor. Therefore, it is submitted 
that this Honorable Court should reverse and remand for trial 
on the issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants are part of a company which established a 
non-contributory profit sharing program to benefit employees. 
The Plan placed certain contractual obligations on employer and 
employees alike. We have been primarily concerned with those 
provisions relating to payment of benefits where the employee is 
terminated for acts constituting material dishonesty or failure 
to follow instructions of the Board of Directors of said company. 
It is Appellants1 position that the record is full of conflicts 
relating to material issues of fact and the Court erred in finding 
-16-
as a matter of law that no dispute exists and that Plaintiff-
Respondent was entitled to judgment. 
Appellants1 brief has pointed out said conflicts in detail 
and submits that if the conflicts can be resolved in the mind of 
the Court, they would be resolved in favor of the Appellants• 
This being the case, Appellants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. We urge that the conflicts relate to genuine issue 
of material facts to be reserved for the trier of facts. Therefor* 
we further urge that the Court reverse the Summary Judgment of the 
lower Court and remand the case for trial and allow Defendants 
their day in Court• 
Qitfully submitted, :. Gre6n4 
Attorney for Appellants 
Served two (2) copies of 
the foregoing Brief of 
Appellants on Respondent 
by delivering to James H, 
Faust at 721 Kearns 
Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on this day of 
October, 19 76. 
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